I want to put forward here a set of propositions that, at first brush, might seem anodyne, but at closer inspection may in fact be far from that: the purpose of economic activity is to increase the well being of individuals, and economic structures that are more desirable than those that do not. To be sure, politicians of all manner-left, right, and center -pay homage to these propositions, and yet, upon closer examination, it turns out that the policies that are often pursued are often antithetical to these propositions. Much of traditional economics has provided considerable comfort to those politicians who have a different agenda, and has provided considerable confusion to those who are sympathetic.
I want to spend a few minutes explaining how standard economic theory-reflected in much of the popular policy folklore-has served to undermine these propositions or runs counter to them. One of the great "tricks" (some might say "insights") of neoc lassical economics is to treat labor like any other factor of production. Output is written as a function of inputs -steel, machines, and labor. The mathematics treats labor like a commodity. And the danger is that, treating labor mathematically like a commodity lulls one into thinking of labor like an ordinary commodity, like steel or plastic. But labor is not just like any other commodity. The work environment is of no concern for steel; we do not care about steel's well-being (though to be sure, we may take care that the environment does not lead to its rusting, or otherwise adversely affects its performance characteristics.)
Steel does not have to be motivated to work as an input. Steel does whatever it is "told" to do. But a good part of the energies of management are concerned with motivating labor.
The distinction arises from the human nature of labor. Individuals decide, for instance, on how hard they work, and with what care. Their behavior is affected by their environment, including the incentives with which they are confronted. In the standard theory, individuals contract to perform a certain job, and are paid if and only if they complete that job. Enforcement of the contract is costless-partly because information about whether the t ask (which is specified in infinite minutia) has been completed. In fact, information imperfections abound in the economy, and these information imperfections have profound impacts on the way the economy behaves, a fact recognized by this year's Nobel Prize (which focused in particular on asymmetries of information).
While this is not the occasion to review all of the implications of information imperfections, I want to highlight three that are particularly germane to the theses of this lecture. First, imperfections of information lead to imperfections of competition; but the striking result of our research was that even a little bit of information imperfection-even a small cost of searching, for instance, for a new job-can have a large effect. Economists always knew that information was imperfect, but they hoped that a little bit of imperfection would only change the equilibrium in a small way, and that the imperfections are indeed small. These hopes were not based analytic work, but rather on the realization that if it was not true, the models that economists had used for decades, and the conclusions derived from those models, were of little relevance. To put it perhaps overgrandly, it would have made, overnight, much of economic analysis obsolete. The new information economics showed, however, that even a small search cost could enable the equilibrium real wage to fall from the competitive level to the monopsony level.
there may be tacit collusion); imperfections of credit markets (credit rationing, which itself can be explained by information imperfections) means that a worker who is unemployed cannot survive well for long; he is in a far more precarious position than the employer who has lost whatever rents he gains from the loss of a worker. What our analysis showed that even if other market imperfections were unimportant, workers are in a decidedly disadvantageous position.
Second, there can be unemployment: even when wages are so high that the demand for labor is less than the supply, wages may not fall; for if a firm lowers its wages, workers' effort (or the quality of workers hired) may decrease (or their turnover costs increase.) To most of the world, this is hardly news. But to standard economic theory it is: neoclassical theory said that markets always clear; what seemed to be unemployment was nothing more than a sudden change in the demand for leisure. Information economics also emphasized that the decentralized adjustment process, to which traditional theory paid no attention--after all, with perfect information it is easy to move to the new equilibrium whenever the economy is disturbed--often worked imperfectly, leading to temporary unemployment rates which even exceeded the equilibrium unemployment rates associated with efficiency wages.
Thirdly, traditional economic theory argued that markets were self-adjusting and efficient, and that the nature of the equilibrium (and its efficiency) did not depend either on distribution or institutions. It was the law of demand and supply that determined the allocation of resources (including incomes), not institutions like sharecropping. Issues of efficiency could conveniently be separated from issues of d istribution. Information economics has challenged each of these propositions. Bruce Greenwald and I showed that when information was imperfect or markets incomplete-that is, always -markets are not even constrained Pareto efficient, i.e. in principle, there existed interventions in the market which took account of the costs of information and of creating a market, and which made everyone better off. 4 The retort to our analysis that there were pervasive market failures that might, in principle, be addressed by government intervention, that we had ignored the imperfections of information in the public sector, was simply wrong. We had taken them into account. We had, in fact, gone further, and identified reasons that the information set of the government, its powers, the constraints it faces, differed from those facing a decentralized private sector, and that provided an explanation for why, at least in principle, government might undertake actions which were welfare improving. 5 We also showed that the nature of the equilibrium, including its efficiency, could well depend on the distribution of wealth. This can be seen most clearly in the case of simple agricultural economies, but in fact holds more generally.
The agency problems associated with sharecropping arise because of the disparity between the ownership of land and capital. Problems of information asymmetry do not arise when workers work their own land. 4 See Greenwald and Stiglitz [1986] 5 See, for instance, Stiglitz [1989] 6 Though information asymmetries may still be important in credit markets.
Whether there was a political agenda in the back of the minds of those who formulated and developed the neoclassical theories I do not want to venture to guess. But it is clear that the theories were found convenient for those with a particular set of interests. If, as neoclassical theory claimed, one could separate out efficiency issues from equity, one could pursue a political program that focused only on the former-saying that if society, through its political process, wanted to change the distribution of income that was an issue which it could turn to at any time; regardless of one's views on equity, it made sense to remove distortions in the economy which impeded efficiency.
In standard competitive models, any interference with the free workings of the economy had an adverse effect on efficiency, whether it was minimum wage laws or unions (which introduced imperfect competition in labor markets) or requirements on working conditions (after all, an employer who offered a worker worse working conditions would only be able to recruit him if he paid a commensurately higher wage; firms would ba lance carefully the extra cost of improving the conditions with the extra wage costs of not doing so, and these extra wage costs represented the marginal benefit of the improved working conditons.) Government interventions to enhance job security were criticized, but even when similar provisions were arrived at as a result of union bargaining, such provisions were criticized, as evidence of monopoly power on the part of unions. Public pension programs were criticized; the payroll taxes allegedly leading to higher labor costs providing a key explanation for unemployment.
It was, of course, inconvenient that many of the central propositions had little empirical support. Card and Krueger's work 7 strongly demonstrated that minimum wage legislation certainly did not have the serious adverse effect on employment predicted by the standard theory-and may even have had a positive effect. Nor did economic theory len d credence to many of the propositions, even without recourse to modern information theories. Even if benefits did not depend on contributions, payroll taxes should largely be shifted backwards, except for minimum wage workers, and hence have no effect on employment; and to the extent that benefits depend on contributions, there may be little or no (or even a positive) effect on labor supply. But information economics explained clearly why market equilibrium was not in general efficient, why, for instance, firms "undersupplied" contract provisions enhancing job security.
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In short, the mantra for increased labor market flexibility was only a thinly disguised attempt to roll back-under the guise of "economic efficiency" -gains that workers had achieved over years and years of bargaining and political activity. To be sure, sometimes unions may have more than corrected the imbalance of bargaining power that previously existed, and used that power to push for excessive protection for their workers, at the expense of other workers in the economy. But if that happens, the answer is not to pretend that in the absence of such protections, the competitive market place will lead to efficient or equitable outcomes; but rather to try to redress the imbalances.
While rights of association are important in correcting the imbalances of market power that exist in labor markets, it is more common that even with such rights workers are in a disadvantageous position. It is far easier for an employer to replace recalcitrant workers than for employees to "replace" a recalcitrant employer, especially when the unemployment rate is high. Thus, there is an important role for government, e.g. in ensuring occupational health and safety.
But there is a range of other policies-sometimes seemingly quite remote from the labor market--which affect the outcome of the bargaining pr ocess.
Capital market liberalization enhances the bargaining power of capital: effectively, it gives "capital" the right to announce that if it is taxed unduly, or if other measures that it disliked are adopted, it will take its money out of the country. It enhances the threat point of capital, and therefore tilts the outcome more in its favor. In the extreme, it means that capital cannot be taxed at all. Had similar measures to enhance labor mobility been adopted, it would have restricted the ability to tax labor as well.
9 A well-known standard result in tax theory says that the optimal taxes should be inversely related to the elasticity of supply; capital market liberalization thus leads to a lower optimal tax. "Labor market flexibility" and "capital market liberalization" thus may appear as symmetric policies, freeing up the labor and capital markets, respectively; but they have very asymmetric consequences-and both serve to enhance the welfare of capital at the expense of workers. So ingrained have these prescriptions become in the mantra of good policy that the distributional consequences have been almost totally ignored; and of course, if efficiency and distribution could be separated, as traditional theory argued it could be, the lapse might not have been so important.
It is not, of course, just that the advocates of these policies overlook the imperfections of competition and of information. There are other market imperfections (some derived from imperfections of information) to which they turn a blind eye. With imperfect insurance markets, individuals worry about the volatility of their income. They can smooth only imperfectly and often at great cost. Risk matters in a way that it would not if markets were perfect. Indeed, surveys of poor workers suggest that insecurity is among their main concerns, that instability is among the most important causes as well manifestations of poverty.
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Yet, the Washington consensus policies have not only pushed policies which enhanced instability, but have also pushed for the elimination of job security protections (which markets by themselves often will not provide).
An important set of market imperfections concerns corporate governance. Managers of firms may not act in the interests of shareholders, majority shareholders may not act in the interests of minority shareholders, and more broadly, the concerns of other stakeholders may not be adequately reflected in the decision making of firms.
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9 See, e.g. Stiglitz [1983a Stiglitz [ , 1983b 10 See World Bank World Development Report, 2000 11 See Stiglitz [1985b] The advocates of these "market friendly policies" (whi ch might more aptly be called "capital market friendly" policies, have, perhaps not surprisingly, not followed consistently the symmetries which the neoclassical model might have led them to. For instance, they talk about the discipline provided by capital market liberalization-a discipline of a capricious market place, exhibiting not only irrational exuberance but from time to time irrational pessimism. Those who subject themselves to this discipline know too that it has particular perspectives and ideologies. Imagine how different the discipline that might be provided if skilled labor, or unskilled labor, were perfectly mobile? It might, for instance, threaten to leave a country that did not provide adequate air quality, or which otherwise had a degraded environment.
As another manifestation of "capital market friendly policies," consider the recent push for privatization of social security and replacing defined benefit program with defined contribution programs. While this is not the occasion for a full debate on the issues 12 , it should be clear that privatization would be of immense benefit to those firms who managed the pension funds and provided the annuities, and would at the same time impose enormously greater risks on workers, since the market in most countries does not provide securities that are fully indexed for inflation. (Moreover, there is evidence suggesting that even in highly efficient capital markets, like the UK, transactions costs are so large that benefits under privatization are reduced by 40%.
13 )
The advocates of the (capital) market friendly doctrines have not consistently followed the doctrines that institutions do not matter. They argue that monetary institutions do matter. Not content to change the broader economic environment in ways which tilt the balance of power, they have pushed for monetary institutions which tilt the balance of power further, pushing for independent, non-representative central banks with a mandate solely for price stability. They again try to use economic "reasoning" to support their conclusion, with regressions that show that countries with independent central banks have lower inflation. 14 But they have confused ends with means -just as the entire enterprise which sees labor merely as input into production confused ends with means. Inflation is of concern only to the extent that it leads to worse real outcomes, e.g. lower growth, more poverty, and greater inequality. And the link between independent central banks and these real outcomes is tenuous at best.
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Even if one believed that institutionally it is preferable to have an independent central bank (the case for which I find more compelling in countries with a long history of high inflation than in those with no such history), independence is not the same as nonrepresentativeness. One can have an independent central bank, where the differing interests of different stakeholders are represented. It is not the case that there is a single 12 For a discussion of some of the fallacies underlying the standard arguments for privatization, see Orszag and Stiglit z [2000] 13 Mamta, Orszag and Orszag (1999) 14 New classical doctrines reinforced these perspectives: they argued that there was no trade-off in the long run. But even if there is no trade-off in the long run, there may be in the short run. So long as the NAIRU is uncertain, different policy frameworks impose different risks. See Stiglitz (1997) . 15 One of the reasons is, of course, that it is hard to establish a significant adverse relationship between inflation and growth for low inflation economies. See Bruno and Easterly [1996] .
Pareto dominant policy, 16 one to which all "reasonable" people can agree, and so long as that is the case, one cannot, or at least, should not, delegate decision making to technocrats, and even less, should one delegate decision making to one group whose interests are markedly different from others. I shall return to this point at the end of the next section.
II.
Level of employment
The previous section argued that there was a role for government in the labor market: at the minimum, ensuring the right to collective action and enforcing minimum standards. The notion that markets fail to ensure socially efficient (and desirable) outcomes has long been recognized. Keynes pointed out that there might be persistent unemployment. But by a sleight of hand, what came to be called the neoclassical synthesis (Samuelson, 1997) argued that once we corrected for the market failure of massive unemployment markets worked efficiency; the standard neoclassical model-with its implications of efficiencyprevailed. The neoclassical synthesis was simply an assertion, a hope, an attempt by those committed to the market model to limit the scope for potential government intervention. Bruce Greenwald and I argued 17 that it was far more plausible to assume that there were pervasive market failures, of which massive unemployment was the most obvious manifestation, the tip of the iceberg that could not be ignored. The research on the economics of information helped explain what was wrong with the standard neoclassical model, why it was the case that there could be equilibrium unemployment 18 , why shoc ks to the economy could be amplified, and result in the economy operating well below its "potential" for extended periods of time, and in the persistence of levels of unemployment that were far higher than the "equilibrium" level.
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Since Keynes and the Great Depression, few have believed in Say's law, that an increase in the supply of labor would automatically bring about an increase in demand. The theories that I just referred to explained how government intervention could help stabilize the economy with less volatility and higher equilibrium levels of employment. The precepts of countercyclical fiscal and monetary policy have come to be taught as part of standard macroeconomics in universities around the world. Yet remarkably, if we look at the data, we see that governments in less developed countries regularly engage in procyclical fiscal policies. Worse still, we have seen how the IMF has advocated fiscal and monetary tightening in the face of an impending recession. We have seen how those policies exacerbated the recessions in East Asia, helping turn one into a depression, from which some have yet to recover fully. It has put in place strategies for financial market restructuring which too have adversely affected macro-economic performance. In i ts structural adjustment programs, it has often combined trade liberalization with interest rates so high that job and enterprise creation would have been impossible even in the best of economic circumstances, let alone in the more adverse circumstances prevailing in 16 Though one strand of research in modern macro-economics, that which contends that there is a vertical Phillips curve, has tried to argue something close to this. 17 Greenwald and Stiglitz [1987] 18 See the large literature on efficiency wages, e.g. Stiglitz [1974 Stiglitz [ , 1987b , Shapiro and Stiglitz [1984] , much of which derives from problems of information imperfections. 19 See, for instance, Greenwald and Stiglitz 1993 most developing countries. As the affected countries could not compete with the highly subsidized agricultural goods from the United States and elsewhere, the principles of comparative advantage did not play out in the way predicted by standard textbooks. Rather than resources moving from low productivity sectors to higher productivity, they simply moved form low productivity to unemployment.
In the economies of transition, the policy framework again all too often did not lead to job creation-and even if the absence of a safety net implied that some employers did not fire their workers, and so there was less open unemployment than there might otherwise have been, it meant that they were underemployed, and often not paid. We now know the devastating effects-a GDP in Russia that is 40% lower than ten years ago, and a poverty rate that has soared from 2% to 40% or higher. Privatization, which was supposed to be the basis of wealth (and job) creation, became the foundations for asset stripping and job destruction.
Repeatedly, we have seen a vicious cycle come into play: With excessively high unemployment rates, social cohesion deteriorates, with a multitude of societal manifestations, from urban violence to riots and civil strife, which create an environment which is unattractive for investment and job creation. We saw that in Indonesia, where I predicted in December 1997 that if the highly contractionary monetary and fiscal policies that had been imposed on that country were maintained, there would be civil and political turmoil within six months. My prediction, unfortunately, proved all too correct.
While high interest rates prevent job creation, in the case of heavily leveraged firms, large increases in interest rates contribute to job destruction-again as we saw in East Asia. They force firms into bankruptcy, and even if eventually the resources get reallocated (though in the process there may be considerable losses in assets and asset values), in the interim there can be high unemployment. And unfortunately, lowering interest rates does no undo the damage: the bankrupt firms do not become unbankrupt. This is one of a number of important hysteresis effects within the labor market.
In development, transition, and crises-or even in o rdinary economic downturns--markets do not automatically quickly lead to full employment, and there is now almost universally recognized to be an important role for government in facilitating employment creation and the maintenance of the economy at full employment. We now know a great deal about how to design effective stimulus programs. We know that monetary policy is more effective in constraining an economy in a boom than in stimulating an economy in recession, and that therefore we need to rely on fiscal measures. We know too a great deal about how to design effective fiscal measures-measures which operate quickly and which have high multipliers (and in countries with strong social divisions, which do not exacerbate those divisions). 20 For instance, policies which change intertemporal prices to encourage consumption and investment during the period of expected unemployment (in which the shadow prices of resources are low) and which reduce liquidity constraints 20 These are, of course, not the only desiderata of stimulus packages: they should strengthen the economy's long run position, or at least not do undue harm.
(themselves explained by asymmetries of information 21 ), which limit expenditures either on investment or consumption, are more effective than, say tax cuts for the rich or permanent investment tax credits.
No matter how well we manage the economy, there will be downturns, and with downturns unemployment. While we know more about macro-economic management 22 , around the world economic crises have become more frequent and deeper (with close to a hundred countries facing crises in the last quarter century). I believe there are some reasons for this: changes in the global economic architecture, including capital market liberalization, have enhanced risks, beyond the coping ability of many developing countries. Thus, anyone who is concerned with employment and decent work must be concerned about those features of the global economic architecture which contribute to volatility, at the same time that countries need to be urged to construct adequate safety nets (though, at the same time, one should recognize the inadequacy of such safety nets, even in advanced industrial countries, in the agricultural and self-employment sectors, sectors which predominate in less developed countries.).
But conversely, it seems perverse simultaneously to argue both for measures that enhance global volatility and against measures that enhance worker security. Yet, remarkably, this is precisely the position that advocates of the neo-liberal doctrines have taken.
The fact that there is a great deal of uncertainty in the dynamics of any economy implies that there is a great deal of uncertainty about the consequences of any policy. Today, for instance, we do not know how deep the recession will be, or would have been were it not for government intervention. All decision-making must take into account these risks; it must entail a process of sequential decision making, with policies revised as new information becomes available. But the policy structures must also take into account irreversibilities and non-linearities, for instance the fact, noted earlier, that while small increases in interest rates may not force a company into bankruptcy, large increases may, with huge implications for the dissolution of organizational capital; and subsequent lowering of interest rates may no undo the damage. Different policies entail different risks, with the risks being borne by different groups within societies. Not surprisingly, the policies advocated by those with financial interests result in a disproportionate share of the risks being borne by workers.
In framing macro-economic policies, we need to keep our eyes on the ultimate objectives, and not on intermediate variables-on employment, growth, living standards, not interest rates, inflation rates, or exchange rates, variables which are important only to the extent that they effect the variables of fundamental importance. Typically, however, macroeconomic analysis is framed around a trade -off between a variable that is of direct concern-employment and output today-and an intermediate variable, inflation. It is asserted that higher inflation will lead to lower growth-though it is hard to find e evidence of a statistically and economically significant relationship for countries, like the United States, facing low inflation. It is asserted that once inflation starts to grow, it will be difficult to turn it back-that the economy is on a precipice of price stability, from which it is easy to fall. Again, there is no evidence for this "precipice theory." Finally, it is asserted that once inflation begins, it is very costly to reverse. The evidence however, is to the contrary-that the "augmented Philips curves" is linear or convex, not concave, at least for the United States. 23 No wonder then that there has been so little analysis of trade-offs between variables of fundamental concern-it is remarkably hard to establish such trade -offs. But even if one could, the analysis needs to focus on risks: what are the risks associated with excessively aggressive policies? With insufficiently aggressive policies? And who bears those risks? It should be clear that alternative policies force different groups within society to bear these risks. 24 It follows then that macro-economic policy is not a purely technical matter, and should not accordingly be delegated to technocrats. It follows even more strongly that it is, to say, the least, problematic, to delegate decision making to an independent central bank which is unrepresentative of the various groups affected by macro-policy, which is dominated by financial interests, and which pays little if any attention to employment.
A concern for employment and workers thus leads us not only to advocate strong macroeconomic policies committed to the maintenance of full employment, and for policies which lead to greater economic stability-and for st rong safety nets to protect workers against the inevitable fluctuations that remain even with the best of economic policiesbut also to institutional arrangements which ensure that the interests and concerns of workers are adequately reflected. Throughout the world, even social democratic governments have failed, in their acquiescence to unrepresentative and independent central banks. There is little evidence to support the view that countries with independent central banks enjoy faster grow, high employment, higher living standards, or higher real wages (holding everything else constant.) It is, of course, hardly surprising that an independent central bank focusing exclusively on inflation leads to lower inflation; but as I said before, inflation is only an intermediate variable. But even if one agrees on independence, it does not follow that the mandate of the central bank should be exclusively on inflation-I would argue that the Fed's broader mandate, which embraces employment and growth, has served America well. And if one argues that monetary policy should take into account effects on employment, as well as other objectives, it implies that if the central bank is independent, it should not be dominated by financial interests; workers should have a voice, and an important one at that.
III. Labor as a means versus an end and development as a transformation of society
While much of this paper focuses on economic analysis-for instance, on institutions and policies which contributed to increasing employment, and on the inadequacies of the neoliberal model, I would be remiss if I failed to note that what is at stake is not just models of how the economy works but also objectives. Much of the neoliberal doctrines have seen labor solely as an input into production, an input just like any other input, as we noted earlier. But if improving living standards is the objective of economics, then improving the welfare of workers becomes an end in itself; and only if one believes that the market leads to efficient outcomes can one feel confident in not paying explicit attention to worker welfare, trusting that the market will make all the correct trade -offs.
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Elsewhere (Stiglitz, 1998) I have argued that development is more than just the accumulation of capital and the reduction in distortions (inefficiencies) in the economy; it is a transformation of society, from traditional ways of doing things and traditional modes of thinking. If development were mainly a matter of capital accumulation, then successful development would entail primarily making a country more attractive for capital, enhancing the "security" of capital. (We put aside here the question of whether the actual policies which the IMF has pushed have actually succeeded in doing so; arguably, capital market liberalization, while it has opened up access to capital, has also led to increased volatility, a higher incidence of crises, and in that sense, at a global level, may have actually not increased capital's "security" 26 )
If, however, development i s to be broader based, then we must pay at least as much attention to workers and their security. We must persuade them that change can benefit them-and if they are exposed to increased insecurity and higher unemployment it will not. But many of the "reform" policies have done exactly that. On a more positive note, successful democratic development entails questioning authority and participation in decision making: democratic workplaces 27 as well as democratic political processes. These entail more democratic governance structures at all levels.
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IV.
The role of the international community
The principles I have set forth are hardly radical, though by terms of market fundamentalist doctrines, which prevail in certain circles, they might seem so. I want to conclude my talk by spending a few minutes on the role of the international community.
I begin with a simple premise, which too should be uncontroversial, but I am afraid may appear to be so. That is, the international community should not push policies that contravene these principles. Yet, that is precisely what the international community has been doing, through the Washington consensus policies that have prevailed within the 25 While I have focused on several of the market failures, there are others, especially relating to education and training, with imperfect contracting. See, e.g. Arnott and Stiglitz [1985] . 26 There are some who argue that the intent was not so much to increase the security of capital as the returns to capital. Increased capital mobility, as already noted, limits t he scope for the taxation of capital, and, given the higher ability of higher income individuals and large corporations to bear risks, the increased riskiness of the global economic environment redistributes income in their favor. 27 There is some evidence that more democratic workplaces enhance economic efficiency. See Blinder [1990] and Levine [1995] . 28 By contrast, IMF conditionality often serves to undermine democratic processes, especially when (as in Korea) the conditionality extends beyond issues directly related to the crisis, and into core political issues. See Feldstein [1998] .
International economic institutions. They have pushed macro-economic policies that have resulted in unnecessarily high unemployment, with pro-cyclical monetary and fiscal policies, the worst and most dramatic manifestations of which were witnessed in East Asia, but which have been clear to those who have worked in developing countries for years. They have pushed financial policies that have replaced automatic stabilizers with automatic destabilizers. (As economies go into recession, non-performing loans increase, and strict enforcement of capital adequacy standards forces banks to cut back credit, automatically accelerating the decline.) They have pushed privatization of old age pensions, which exposes the elderly to risks from which they might otherwise have been protected, and which imposes transactions costs, which while they enrich the providers of these financial services, diminishes markedly the benefits received by the elderly. They have not only pushed policies like capital market liberalization which expose countries to enormous risks which they cannot manage well, but they have pushed "labor market flexibility," making workers bear more fully the brunt of the adverse consequences of those policies. They have opposed, or at least not supported, demands for rights to collective action. (The argument they put forward is that that would intrude into politics-though in a myriad of other contexts, they feel perfectly comfortable doing so.) This is not the occasion to try to explain why they have taken such stances, though given the governance structure they can hardly come as a surprise: They are run by finance ministers and central bank governors, whose interests, perspectives, and ideology is often not fully sympathetic with the concerns of workers.
But I think the international community should go further. The IMF was established more than a half century ago out of fears that, as the Second World War came to an end, the world sink once again into a global recession. The IMF was supposed to be pressure on countries to have expansionary policies, recognizing that a downturn in one country has spillovers on others (a negative externality), and to provide the resources with which that could be done. It has not only abandoned its original mandate; it has, perversely, taken up the opposite banner, all too often providing funds to countries only on the condition that they engage in contractionary policies. I noted earlier the fact that many ldc's have procyclical fiscal policies. All too often this perversity arises not from a lack of knowledge of modern economics, but from a lack of resources. As the expression goes, banks love to lend to those who do not need their money; when developing countries go into recessions, they pull their loans, exacerbating the downturn. Developing countries may not only force exorbitant interest rates, with risk premiums that reflect an irrational pessimism which is the counterpoint to the excessive exuberance of the boom; they may find themselves unable to access credit. There is now considerable support to the hypothesis that there may be credit rationing 29 , the presence of which can be explained by theories of imperfect and asymmetric information (see, e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) . The presence of this credit rationing (sometimes referred to as liquidity constraints) provides the rationale for the IMF: why an international public institution is required. But unfortunately, rather than providing needed liquidity to developing countries to enable them to pursue full employment policies, typically the IMF provides liquidity to countries only on the conditional that they pursue contractionary policies. 29 Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) .
But there is a more fundamental criticism of the IMF strategies, which focus on country's trade deficits. Countries with large trade deficits are told to cut them back, but nary a wor d of criticism is leveled at the countries maintaining sustained trade surpluses. If deficits are vice, then surpluses must be a virtue. How different from Keynes' conception: it was surplus countries that were the source of the problem, as their insistence on high levels of savings contributed to "underconsumption" and an insufficiency of aggregate demand, threatening global prosperity. There was even discussion of imposing penalties on surplus countries.
The more modern IMF seems to have missed a central identity: the sum of all trade surpluses and deficits must add up to zero, so if some countries -like Japan and Chinainsist on having large surpluses, other countries must have correspondingly large deficits. The deficits are like hot potatoes. As one country is forced to eliminate its deficit, it must show up somewhere else in the system. With a focus on trade deficits, no wonder then that there is always an impending crisis somewhere in the world.
These issues have taken on a greater urgency today as the world is slipping into a major slowdown. The issue is not whether growth will be negative: the point is that the global economy is performing markedly below its potential, and the gap will inevitably result in increases in unemployment.
There is a simple remedy. As I observed earlier, problems of insufficiency of global aggregate demand were very much on the minds of Keynes and others at the time the IMF was established. There is a framework for enhancing aggregate purchasing power, through the creation of SDR's. One way of thinking about this is the following: Assume that the nation's of the world wish to maintain reserves equal to a fixed percentage of their GDP. With global GDP of around $40 trillion, and growth of around 2%, if reserves were equal to 5% of GDP, aggregate reserves would grow by $40 billion a year. Given China and Japan's surpluses, a number twice that size might be more realistic. An annual issue of SDR's in that amount would just offset the purchasing power that was set aside in reserves, and thus not be inflationary. The SDR's could be used to pursue global interests-from helping the poorest countries to improving the global environment.
For the past several decades, the IMF has focused on bailing out creditors and pushing the neo-liberal agenda. The time is ripe for the IMF to return to its original missionensuring global liquidity, to enable sustained global growth, and with that growth, full employment.
But I think the international community should go still further: it is not enough just to do "no harm," or to have the IMF return to its role in promoting global economic prosperity. The international community should push for decent work, for full employment and better working conditions. Today there is international surveillance of countries in terms of the conformity to international norms for macro-economic policies and financial institutions. The IMF's article 4 consultations have grown beyond a review of whether countries are complying with the articles of agreement, to an intrusive review of a variety of policies-but while some macro-economic indicators get enormous attention, others, such as the level of employment, the level of wages and disparities in compensation, are virtually ignored. I believe very strongly that information helps shape behavior. If we focus on unemployment, we will almost inevitably seek to ensure that it remains with reasonable limits, and if it does not, we will inquire into why not. If we demand that before programs (such as structure adjustment programs) are adopted, there be a "labor impact statement" then it is more likely that policies which minimize the adverse impacts on workers will be adopted.
The reviews must be conducted by those with expertise in labor markets. It is high time that we recognize that there are trade -offs in economic policies, that there is not a single Pareto dominant policy. We should also recognize that there is a great deal of uncertainty about the consequences of economic policies, and tha t there is a perhaps not surprising correlation between those with particular perspectives and interests, and the views of the economy. It was those from the financial community who were the most ardent advocates of capital market liberalization, sliding over the absence of compelling empirical and theoretical evidence that it increased growth, and the presence of compelling evidence that it increased instability. Within the economics profession, labor economists are far more skeptical about claims that even moderate minimum wages result in significant unemployment; even if one does not accept the Card and Krueger (1995) findings that there is no adverse effect, their results make a compelling case that if there is an adverse effect, it is not large.
We need a new framework for article 4 consultations, one that is conducted with greater openness and transparency, with broader participation. These consultations would serve not to impose conditions on countries, but rather to enhance the kinds of dialogue on economic policy that should be central to democracy. This may be a modest reform: but it is a small step that we can take towards the creation of economic policies that promote social justice and societal well-being.
V. Concluding Remarks
Labor policy has in many countries been subsumed under broader economic policies, and those policies have come to be dominated, in all too many cases, by commercial and financial interests. Those interests have been enormously successful in propagating the idea that policies which advance their interests benefit all-a new version of trickle down economics which suggests that workers do not even have to wait long or at all to receive the benefits of these wise policies. Since there is a single Pareto dominant set of policies, economic policy can simply be entrusted to technocrats, whose job is to craft that Pareto dominant policy. For too long labor has acquiesced, sometimes becoming an even more effective advocate of the policies than those whose interests they serve.
Let me be clear: what I am calling for is not the return to class warfare, but a simple recognition of long standing principles: that there are trade -offs, that there is uncertainty, that different policies affect different groups differently, that the role of the economic adviser is to inform policymakers of the consequences of different decisions, and it is the role of the political process to make those decisions.
The fact that these principles have often been subverted itself has some important implications. While we all speak passionately about the importance of democratic principles, we also recognize that our democracies are imperfect, and that some groups' voices are heard more loudly than others. In the arena of international economic policy, the voices of commercial and financial interests are heard far more loudly than those of labor and consumer interests. As we have noted, they have tried to convince others, with remarkable success, that there is no conflict of interests-which means that there are no trade -offs. The consequences speak for themselves: The growing dissatisfaction with the reform policies 30 is partly a consequence of the fact that so many have actually been made worse off. In Mexico, for instance, the incomes of the poorest 30% of the population have actually declined over the past sixteen years. All of the income gains (reflected in increases in average GDP per capita) have occurred among the richest 30%, and especially among the richest 10%. The IDB study conclude s, "No country in Latin America for which data on income distribution are available can boast a decline in income inequality during the 1990s."
31
The role of government (and the international economic institutions, which are intergovernmental public instit utions 32 ) in determining the economic framework (including those that affect labor relations) means that one cannot separate out politics from economics. The two are intimately intertwined. This was recognized by Teddy Roosevelt at the turn of the previous century. His attack on trusts was not so much motivated by the loss of efficiency from the Harberger triangles resulting from monopoly power, as by the loss of democracy from the concentration of political power that follows from the concentration of economic power. The more stringent laws concerning concentration of media power reflect similar concerns. Yet the economic policies that the international institutions have often pushed have resulted in the devastation of the middle classes and the aggrandizement of economic power. When national monopolies are sold prior to the establishment of effective regulatory and anti-trust institutions, those who hold these monopoly powers will use their wealth to perpetuate it. It is not the Bill Gates and the John D. Rockefellers of the world that have been the strongest advocates of competition policy! The interplay between politics and economics has been seen most dramatically in Russia, where the privatization process resulted in the devastation of the middle class, and the creation of huge inequalities and an oligarchy, which, if it seeks to 30 An IDB study (Inter-American Development Bank (2000) ) suggested that 60% of the population think the economy is in trouble and 70% see no possibility of improvement in the near term. 31 Inter-American Development Bank 32 They have been instrumental in perpetuating the myth that there is a single Pareto dominant strategyand the notion that economic policy is apolitical. Not only are they not supposed to enter into political matters (though they do so regularly and inevitably), they refer to the member governments as their shareholders, suggesting that they are more akin to corporations than to political institutions. establish a rule of law, will use its wealth and power to try to ensure that that rule of law favors itself.
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I have tried in this paper to broaden the discussion beyond the confines of economics: there are market failures, and there is a role for government in correcting those market failures. Markets by themselves may fail not only to create full employment, but also to provide the right kind of working conditions. There are imperfections of competition and imperfections of corporate governance, and laws granting workers the rights to association (collective bargaining) may serve to redress the balance, to give more effective voice to the concerns of workers, to enhance overall economic efficiency.
In more advanced industrial countries, we have developed a variety of institutions (including a strong independent academia and thinktanks and NGO's) which give voice to broader national concerns, to the interests of consumers and workers, which limit the scope, even if imperfectly, of special interests. This is not so in many developing countries. What is at stake for these countries is not just a matter of economic efficiency, but the kind of society into which they will evolve, and the creation, or survival of meaningful political democracy. Income distribution and the creation of institutions which give effective voice to the concerns of workers matter, not just for economic efficiency, but for the dynamics of political and economic change. To take but one example: land reform. In many countries of the world, land is highly inequitably distributed, and much of land is held in the form of sharecropping. The 50% share which farmers must pay attenuates incentives. Were a government to impose a 50% tax, the international economic institutions would speak out loudly about the attenuation of incentives. The seeming lack of concern on the part of the IMF 34 is hardly a surprise: land reform would disturb established economic interests, and might even question existing property rights, regardless of how those property claims had come to be established. An even stronger case for land reform can be made: several of the most successful developing countries have had major land reforms prior to or at early stages of their development transformation. With interests of unions coinciding with those of the landless, 35 the two can be a potent force for land reform.
Development is more than just the accumulation of capital and the enhanced efficiency of resource allocation; it is transformation of society. Equitable, sustainable, and democratic development requires basic labor rights, including the freedom of association and collective bargaining.
If we, as an international community, are to promote equitable, sustainable, and democratic development-development that promotes societal well-being and conforms to basic principles of social justice-we must reform the international economic architecture, and we must speak out more loudly against policies which work against the 33 See Hoff and Stiglitz [2001] for a discussion of how macro-economic and other policies induced policies of asset stripping rather than wealth creation, and enhanced the likelihood of success of political policies that were more congenial to the former than the latter. 34 The World Bank has actually begun to push for market based land reforms. 35 Land reform reduces migration pressure, which induces downward pressure on urban wages.
